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This	  article	  questions	  the	  widely	  held	  notions	  of	  Russian	  exceptionalism	  as	  regards	  its	  state-­‐
society	  relations,	  arguing	  that	  the	  conceptual	  tools	  used	  to	  study	  governance	  in	  other	  
regions	  and	  contexts	  are	  applicable	  in	  Russia,	  opening	  the	  potential	  for	  fruitful	  comparisons	  
and	  dialogue.	  We	  develop	  an	  analytical	  framework	  for	  studying	  Russian	  governance,	  placing	  
special	  emphasis	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  networking.	  We	  posit	  that	  even	  in	  contemporary	  hybrid	  
authoritarian	  regimes	  the	  state	  is	  dependent	  to	  an	  extent	  on	  interactive	  governance	  
arrangements	  involving	  civil	  society	  actors.	  The	  article	  applies	  the	  analytical	  framework	  to	  an	  
initial	  synthesis	  of	  findings	  from	  studies	  of	  Russian	  governance,	  reported	  in	  depth	  elsewhere	  
in	  the	  Symposium.	  The	  research	  demonstrates	  that	  networking	  with	  domestic	  civil	  society	  
organisations,	  when	  sanctioned	  and	  deemed	  useful,	  subsists	  alongside	  state-­‐centred	  modes	  
of	  governing.	  This	  co-­‐existence	  should	  not	  be	  exaggerated,	  but	  it	  is	  nonetheless	  important.	  
Russia	  has	  therefore	  developed	  a	  special	  relationship	  with	  its	  civil	  society,	  like	  other	  hybrid	  
authoritarian	  regimes.	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This	  article	  develops	  an	  analytical	  framework	  for	  re-­‐examining	  state-­‐civil	  society	  relations	  in	  
Russia	  through	  a	  critical	  application	  of	  network	  governance	  theory.	  It	  applies	  this	  framework	  
in	  synthesising	  the	  findings	  from	  two	  research	  projects	  on	  network	  governance	  in	  Russia,	  
funded	  by	  the	  Research	  Council	  of	  Norway’s	  NORRUSS	  Programme	  and	  the	  Metro	  
Foundation.	  The	  research	  has	  been	  carried	  out	  in	  collaboration	  between	  researchers	  from	  
Russia,	  Germany,	  Finland,	  Great	  Britain,	  and	  Norway.	  The	  symposium	  explores	  five	  Russian	  
policy	  areas:	  migration	  and	  integration;	  drug	  policy;	  child	  protection;	  environmental	  impact	  
assessment	  (EIA);	  and	  ethnic	  policies.	  Research	  has	  been	  carried	  out	  in	  the	  Russian	  regions	  
of	  St	  Petersburg,	  Samara,	  Krasnodar,	  Stavropol,	  Irkutsk,	  Perm,	  and	  Nizhnyi	  Novogorod.	  
	  
The	  premise	  of	  our	  research	  was	  that	  Russia	  can	  fruitfully	  be	  studied	  by	  employing	  concepts	  
familiar	  in	  the	  study	  of	  governance	  worldwide,	  including	  the	  tools	  of	  network	  analysis	  (e.g.,	  
Rhodes,	  1997).	  The	  central	  contributions	  of	  this	  article	  are	  twofold.	  First,	  it	  presents	  the	  
framework	  for	  analysing	  technologies	  of	  hybrid	  governance	  employed	  in	  Russia	  today.	  
Second,	  we	  apply	  the	  analytical	  framework	  to	  produce	  an	  initial	  synthesis	  of	  findings	  from	  
the	  empirical	  research.	  The	  synthesis	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  Russian	  state	  depends,	  to	  an	  
extent,	  on	  cultivating	  networks.	  Although	  Russian	  civil	  society	  actors	  are	  relatively	  weak	  
(Belyaeva	  and	  Proskuryakova	  2008),	  they	  nevertheless	  play	  a	  meaningful	  and	  specific	  role	  in	  
the	  country's	  governance.	  The	  study	  therefore	  suggests	  that	  the	  “hybrid	  regime”	  (Petrov,	  
Lipman	  and	  Hale	  2010)	  confronts	  dilemmas	  familiar	  to	  scholars	  and	  practitioners	  of	  
governance	  globally,	  albeit	  with	  a	  distinctly	  Russian	  flavour.	  The	  article	  begins	  by	  explaining	  
the	  rationale	  for	  the	  study	  and	  then	  develops	  the	  analytical	  framework	  in	  two	  steps:	  




typology	  of	  governance	  technologies.	  The	  final	  section	  synthesises	  findings	  from	  the	  study	  
reported	  in	  the	  Symposium	  and	  highlights	  questions	  for	  further	  research.	  	  
State	  and	  Society	  in	  Russia	  
Our	  inquiry	  begins	  at	  the	  intersection	  of	  Russia’s	  policy-­‐making	  structures	  and	  the	  policy	  
challenges	  it	  faces.	  Our	  concern	  is	  not	  with	  "dark"	  networks	  such	  as	  corrupt,	  complex,	  
overlapping,	  and	  often	  conflictual	  relations	  among	  state	  and	  corporate	  elites	  (Raab	  and	  
Milward	  2003;	  Kononenko	  and	  Moshes	  2011),	  or	  equally	  convoluted	  relations	  between	  the	  
state	  and	  civil	  society	  organisations	  funded	  by	  foreign	  donors	  and	  forced	  to	  register	  as	  
'foreign	  agents'.	  Rather,	  we	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  poorly	  understood	  practices	  of	  interaction,	  or	  
networking,	  among	  state	  and	  domestic	  civil	  society	  groups	  active	  in	  several	  Russian	  policy	  
areas	  (migration	  and	  integration,	  drug	  policy,	  child	  protection,	  EIA,	  and	  ethnic	  policies).	  The	  
state-­‐civil	  society	  perspective	  directs	  our	  attention	  to	  core	  issues	  in	  “traditional”	  scholarly	  
works	  on	  Russia,	  but	  from	  a	  novel	  standpoint.	  	  
A	  frequently	  cited	  reason	  for	  doubting	  that	  Russia	  can	  be	  analysed	  with	  the	  
conventional,	  network-­‐focused	  governance	  heuristics	  is	  the	  historic	  weakness	  of	  its	  civil	  
society.	  	  Gramsci	  conceived	  government	  and	  civil	  society	  as	  inter-­‐dependent,	  defining	  the	  
“integral	  state”	  (1971:	  262-­‐3)	  as	  the	  sum	  of	  “political	  society	  +	  civil	  society”.	  “	  Political	  
society”	  is	  the	  sphere	  of	  government	  within	  the	  “public”	  domain	  of	  the	  state,	  and	  “civil	  
society”	  the	  assemblage	  of	  “so-­‐called	  private	  organisations,	  like	  the	  church,	  trade	  unions,	  
schools	  and	  so	  on”	  (Gramsci,	  1971:	  56	  fn).	  The	  theory	  of	  the	  integral	  state	  was	  Gramsci’s	  
solution	  to	  the	  puzzle	  of	  why	  Western	  nations	  proved	  immune	  to	  Bolshevism.	  Capitalist	  
hegemony	  depends	  on	  the	  coercive	  apparatus,	  but	  is	  sustained	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  through	  the	  




most	  notably	  the	  media,	  church,	  and	  trusts,	  constituting	  “the	  state	  in	  an	  organic	  and	  larger	  
sense”	  (Thomas,	  2009:	  96).	  	  Gramsci	  saw	  civil	  society	  in	  Russia	  and	  the	  east	  as	  “primordial	  
and	  gelatinous”,	  rendering	  it	  vulnerable	  to	  Bolshevism	  (Gramsci	  1971:	  238).	  Later	  20th	  
century	  writing	  on	  Russia	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  also	  treats	  civil	  society	  as	  residual,	  because	  of	  
the	  overweening	  and	  repressive	  presence	  of	  the	  state	  in	  all	  spheres	  of	  life.	  Russia	  was	  
essentially	  and	  deeply	  “autocratic”	  (Pipes	  1995,	  1999),	  and	  still	  today,	  civil	  society	  
organisations	  in	  Russia	  remain	  weak	  (Belyaeva	  and	  Proskuryakova	  2008;	  Evans	  2012).	  	  	  
However,	  our	  guiding	  hypothesis	  is	  that	  there	  is	  more	  to	  civil	  society	  in	  the	  21st	  century	  than	  
in	  the	  classical	  Gramscian	  view,	  and	  that	  the	  study	  of	  government-­‐civil	  society	  relations	  will	  
cast	  a	  new	  light	  on	  the	  governance	  of	  Russia.	  	  On	  closer	  inspection,	  the	  seemingly	  
authoritarian	  and	  paternalistic	  mode	  of	  governance	  in	  Russia	  includes	  a	  host	  of	  interactive	  
practices:	  co-­‐optation,	  negotiation,	  and	  networking	  between	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors.	  It	  is	  
this	  empirical	  observation	  that	  leads	  us	  to	  focus	  not	  on	  what	  differentiates	  Russia	  –	  although	  
always	  mindful	  of	  this	  -­‐	  but	  rather	  what	  it	  might	  have	  in	  common	  with	  other	  countries	  in	  
seeking	  to	  handle	  policy	  challenges	  through	  more	  or	  less	  authentic	  interactions	  with	  civil	  
society	  actors.	  For	  example,	  some	  theorists	  highlighted	  the	  need	  for	  state-­‐society	  
interactions	  even	  under	  so-­‐called	  “state	  socialism”.	  Richard	  Sakwa	  (1998:	  185)	  described	  a	  
transformatory	  state	  that	  had	  to	  adapt	  to	  –	  make	  peace	  with	  –	  its	  social	  surroundings.	  The	  
transformatory	  project	  was	  made	  ideological,	  whilst	  adaptive	  processes	  were	  de-­‐ideologised	  
(Sakwa	  1998:185).	  Stark	  and	  Bruszt	  (1998)	  drew	  attention	  to	  the	  need	  for	  the	  state	  to	  
nurture	  and	  cooperate	  with	  non-­‐state	  actors,	  to	  keep	  the	  wheels	  in	  motion	  during	  the	  
shortage	  economy	  of	  the	  time.	  More	  broadly,	  as	  Davies	  (2012:	  2700)	  argued,	  “it	  is	  hard	  to	  
see	  how	  even	  extreme	  hierarchies,	  such	  as	  North	  Korea,	  could	  survive	  without	  a	  modicum	  of	  




literature	  implies	  that	  state-­‐society-­‐business	  interactions	  did	  not	  have	  to	  be	  re-­‐invented	  
after	  1991,	  but	  rather	  drew	  upon	  and	  adapted	  earlier	  practices	  and	  traditions.	  	  
Russia	  therefore	  confronts	  policy-­‐making	  challenges	  with	  an	  institutional/structural	  and	  
informal	  heritage	  that	  to	  an	  extent	  delineates	  contours	  of	  governmental	  and	  non-­‐
governmental	  networks.	  These	  networks	  help	  the	  state	  address	  problems	  the	  state	  cannot	  
adequately	  solve	  without	  mobilising	  civil	  society	  resources,	  including	  expert	  advice,	  policy	  
ideas,	  organisational	  resources,	  and	  the	  capacity	  to	  enhance	  legitimacy	  –	  which	  also	  
contribute	  to	  its	  durability.	  Today’s	  “hybrid	  regime”	  has	  to	  address	  challenges	  the	  state	  
cannot	  adequately	  solve	  without	  to	  a	  certain	  degree	  drawing	  on	  civil	  society	  resources,	  as	  
shown	  in	  Brian	  Taylor’s	  (2014)	  study	  on	  police	  reform	  2009-­‐2011	  and	  Kirsti	  Stuvøy’s	  (2014)	  
study	  on	  the	  Public	  Chamber	  in	  Murmansk.	  	  
We	  see	  two	  further	  grounds	  for	  supporting	  and	  refining	  this	  conjecture.	  First,	  throughout	  its	  
imperial,	  Soviet,	  and	  post-­‐Soviet	  periods,	  the	  Russian	  leadership	  has	  sought	  in	  different	  ways	  
to	  achieve	  administrative	  regularity	  and	  public	  order	  through	  promotion	  –	  from	  above	  –	  of	  
state-­‐civil	  order,	  rational	  regulation	  of	  law	  and	  the	  economy,	  and	  refined	  social	  norms	  (Malia	  
1999:28).	  In	  fact,	  Russia’s	  public	  administration	  may	  at	  times	  seem	  obsessed	  with	  
formalities.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  it	  appears	  ready	  to	  take	  informal	  shortcuts	  when	  needed	  by	  
cooperating	  with	  other	  actors.	  Sakwa	  (2010a,	  2010b)	  captures	  this	  duality	  by	  distinguishing	  
Russia’s	  formal	  “normative	  state”	  and	  its	  “administrative	  regime”.	  The	  collaborative	  
governance	  we	  aim	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  more	  prevalent	  in	  the	  administrative	  
regime	  than	  the	  normative	  state	  (although	  present	  also	  in	  the	  latter),	  such	  as	  formalised	  




Second,	  the	  developmental	  trajectory	  of	  Russia’s	  state	  bodies,	  businesses,	  professional	  
associations,	  and	  voluntary	  groups	  are	  quite	  different	  from	  those	  in	  the	  West,	  and	  the	  
circumstances	  under	  which	  policy	  networks	  develop	  differ	  –	  not	  least	  in	  the	  face	  of	  policy	  
vacillations.	  Since	  the	  demise	  of	  the	  USSR,	  Russia	  has	  been	  through	  periods	  of	  denigrating	  
the	  state	  (Hedlund	  2001;	  Shlapentokh	  2003),	  vigorous	  attempts	  to	  cultivate	  civil	  society	  from	  
above	  (Henry	  and	  Sundstrom	  2006),	  and	  a	  renewed	  period	  of	  nationalist	  authoritarianism,	  
combined	  with	  more	  or	  less	  effective	  consultative	  mechanisms	  (Petrone	  2011).	  Despite	  the	  
latest	  authoritarian	  turn,	  this	  history	  of	  policy	  churn	  and	  U-­‐turns	  may	  have	  left	  deficits	  in	  
state	  capacity,	  leading	  the	  authorities	  to	  seek	  collaboration	  with	  civil	  society	  organisations.	  
These	  collaborations,	  however,	  are	  almost	  exclusively	  done	  in	  contexts	  where	  the	  state	  not	  
only	  sets	  he	  terms	  of	  engagement,	  but	  also	  often	  creates	  the	  civil	  society	  with	  which	  to	  
engage.	  The	  latest	  scholarship	  on	  Russia’s	  governance	  conceptualises	  this	  duality	  in	  terms	  of	  
“substitutions”,	  i.e.,	  compensating	  for	  the	  lack	  of	  functioning	  formal	  state	  institutions	  and	  
resolving	  the	  potential	  tension	  between	  the	  state	  and	  societal	  actors	  by	  creating	  hybrid	  
actors	  where	  the	  state	  does	  not	  have	  formal	  ownership	  rights	  but	  maintains	  the	  control	  
stake	  (Petrov,	  Lipman	  and	  Hale	  2014).	  In	  fact,	  there	  may	  be	  a	  parallel	  between	  Russia’s	  
“substitution”	  and	  the	  tendency	  elsewhere	  to	  let	  “network	  governance”	  substitute	  
processes	  and	  procedures	  of	  representative	  democracy.	  	  
Russia’s	  Governance	  Challenges	  
The	  “hybrid	  governance”	  model	  in	  Russia	  is	  not	  unique.	  Former	  state	  socialist	  countries	  have	  
experienced	  two	  and	  a	  half	  decades	  of	  functional	  differentiation,	  specialisation,	  
privatisation,	  and	  the	  semi-­‐privatisation	  of	  public	  agencies	  (Randmaa-­‐Liiv	  2008;	  Randma-­‐Liiv,	  




enhances	  the	  case	  for	  researching	  state-­‐civil	  society	  cooperation	  in	  more	  depth	  and	  
considering	  the	  relevance	  of	  network	  governance	  theories.	  Some	  former	  public	  bodies	  are	  
now	  semi-­‐private	  firms,	  at	  times	  with	  a	  non-­‐governmental	  organisation	  (NGO)	  attached	  to	  
them.	  Fragmentation	  may	  lead	  to	  new	  attempts	  at	  co-­‐ordination.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  
narrative	  of	  increased	  “complexity”	  used	  to	  warrant	  network	  governance	  in	  Northern	  
Europe	  can	  also	  be	  traced	  in	  Russian	  policy	  discourses	  (e.g.	  Elbakidze	  et	  al.	  2010),	  leading	  us	  
to	  consider	  whether	  they	  too	  represent	  networking	  as	  part	  of	  the	  solution	  (see	  below	  for	  a	  
discussion	  of	  problem	  and	  actor-­‐centred	  approaches	  to	  network	  governance).	  	  
Russian	  legislation	  and	  policies	  reflect	  a	  policy	  of	  enabling	  cooperation	  between	  public,	  
societal,	  and	  market	  sectors	  (Jakobson	  and	  Sanovich	  2010;	  Hemment	  2012;	  Chebankova	  
2013;	  Crotty,	  Hall	  &	  Ljubownikow	  2014;	  Daucé	  2014).	  This	  has	  been	  particularly	  evident	  in	  
social	  welfare.	  The	  overall	  Russian	  welfare	  system	  is	  under	  reform.	  Despite	  the	  official	  
rhetoric	  on	  “sovereign	  democracy”,	  “Russia	  following	  its	  own	  way”,	  and	  so	  on,	  reforms	  bear	  
the	  clear	  stamp	  of	  international	  inspiration.	  Greater	  market	  provision	  and	  less	  public	  
provision	  form	  part	  of	  these	  welfare	  reforms,	  and	  these	  tendencies	  have	  gained	  speed	  since	  
the	  turn	  of	  the	  millennium	  (Cook	  2013:3;	  Tarasenko	  2015;	  Bindman	  2015).	  
The	  clamp	  down	  on	  NGOs	  financed	  from	  abroad	  (the	  so-­‐called	  “foreign	  agents”	  law	  enacted	  
in	  2012)	  was	  simultaneously	  combined	  with	  a	  grant	  scheme	  for	  domestic	  funding.	  In	  2005,	  
the	  Law	  no.	  32-­‐FZ	  “On	  the	  Public	  Chamber”	  introduced	  this	  institution:	  to	  manage	  societal	  
expertise,	  societal	  initiatives	  and	  control;	  to	  distribute	  grants	  to	  civil	  society	  organisations;	  
and	  to	  present	  an	  annual	  report	  on	  civil	  society	  (Tarasenko	  2010;	  Petrone	  2011;	  Chebankova	  
2013:	  110).	  One	  of	  the	  main	  functions	  of	  the	  Public	  Chamber,	  which	  operates	  at	  the	  regional	  




terms	  “public	  control”	  of	  the	  state	  apparatus,	  legislation,	  and	  policies.	  By	  carrying	  out	  these	  
functions,	  the	  Public	  Chamber	  takes	  on	  a	  role	  to	  some	  extent	  resembling	  the	  intricate	  
system	  of	  public	  hearings	  and	  NGO,	  trade	  union,	  and	  expert	  involvement	  found	  in	  Nordic	  
countries.	  Owen	  (2015)	  shows	  how	  human	  rights	  activists	  join	  Public	  Monitoring	  
Commissions	  for	  created	  by	  the	  state	  to	  perform	  “public	  control”	  by	  overseeing	  conditions	  in	  
prisons	  are	  able	  to	  effect	  improvements.	  
In	  his	  2009	  address	  to	  the	  Federal	  Assembly,	  President	  Dmitry	  Medvedev	  proposed	  to	  
introduce	  a	  new	  category	  of	  “socially	  oriented	  NGO’s”	  which	  led	  to	  Law	  7-­‐FZ	  “On	  Non-­‐
Commercial	  Organisations”	  in	  April	  2010	  (Chebankova	  2013:105)	  In	  July	  2009,	  the	  state	  
doctrine	  on	  charitable	  work,	  “On	  the	  support	  of	  charitable	  work”,	  a	  document	  drafted	  with	  
inputs	  from	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Economic	  Development,	  the	  Public	  Chamber,	  and	  charitable	  
organisations.	  Here	  the	  state	  and	  local	  governments	  would	  share	  responsibility	  for	  
supporting	  the	  non-­‐commercial	  organisations	  financially	  and	  also	  for	  providing	  services	  
(Prognostika	  2011:29).	  Big	  business	  supports	  charitable	  organisations	  to	  show	  loyalty	  to	  the	  
state	  and	  consolidate	  its	  political	  position	  (Chebankova	  2013:	  107).	  
In	  a	  study	  of	  relations	  between	  public,	  societal,	  and	  market	  sectors,	  Vasil’eva	  (2009)	  found	  
evidence	  of	  cooperation	  based	  on	  the	  concepts	  of	  “equal	  rights,	  solidarity,	  shared	  
responsibility,	  shared	  interests,	  unity	  of	  core	  values,	  and	  readiness	  to	  compromise”.	  This	  
cooperation	  does	  not	  remove	  the	  contradictions	  and	  differences	  in	  interests,	  but	  the	  idea	  is	  
that	  the	  application	  of	  dialogue	  and	  compromise	  may	  help	  solve	  potential	  conflicts.	  At	  the	  
same	  time,	  Vasil’eva	  argues	  that	  this	  kind	  of	  cooperation	  strengthens	  state	  actors’	  authority:	  
there	  is	  cooperation	  and	  dialogue,	  but	  state	  power	  is	  not	  nullified.	  At	  a	  very	  local	  level	  –	  like	  




institutions	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  TOS	  –	  Territorial	  societal	  self-­‐government	  –	  also	  address	  policy	  
challenges.	  They	  are	  conceived	  to	  enable	  partnership	  between	  population	  and	  authorities.	  
They	  can	  be	  independent	  organisations,	  non-­‐commercial	  entities	  or	  NGO’s	  (Chebankova	  
2013:106).	  	  
Our	  conjecture	  is	  therefore	  that	  social	  policy	  challenges	  require	  approaches	  that	  are	  not	  
entirely	  “top-­‐down”,	  and	  that	  there	  are	  limits	  to	  the	  efficacy	  of	  the	  state.	  Therefore,	  Russia’s	  
public	  authorities	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors	  including	  experts	  and	  NGOs	  must	  sometimes	  find	  
ways	  of	  collaborating	  if	  each	  is	  to	  stand	  a	  chance	  of	  fulfilling	  their	  own	  goals.	  We	  anticipate	  
that	  authorities	  need	  the	  legitimacy	  they	  acquire	  from	  co-­‐operating	  with	  societal	  
organisations,	  and	  that	  these	  organisations	  are	  often	  sources	  of	  valuable	  expertise,	  
knowledge	  and	  skills,	  of	  voluntary	  man	  hours	  and	  alternative,	  additional	  financing.	  The	  
research	  synthesised	  in	  the	  final	  section	  of	  the	  article	  focuses	  on	  governance	  arrangements	  
involving	  domestically	  resourced	  civil	  society	  organisations.	  It	  lends	  support	  to	  our	  
conjecture,	  highlighting	  a	  surprising	  variety	  of	  networked	  practices	  and	  demonstrating	  how	  
different	  ways	  of	  governing	  overlap	  –	  with	  networks	  often	  created	  and	  nurtured	  by	  state	  
actors,	  but	  only	  partially	  constrained	  by	  state	  authority,	  discipline,	  and	  control.	  To	  this	  
extent,	  and	  suitably	  qualified,	  notions	  of	  network	  governance	  may	  make	  a	  useful	  
contribution	  to	  understanding	  Russia	  –	  and	  to	  comparative	  research	  on	  Russia	  and	  other	  
countries	  based	  on	  alternative	  governing	  systems.	  
Networks,	  Governance,	  and	  Russia	  	  
In	  this	  section,	  we	  explain	  our	  analytical	  framework	  for	  studying	  network	  governance	  in	  
Russia.	  It	  is	  set	  out	  in	  two	  parts.	  First,	  we	  discuss	  salient	  approaches	  to	  network	  governance.	  




network	  governance	  paradigm,	  which	  show	  that	  while	  non-­‐coercive	  networking	  is	  a	  
common	  governing	  practice	  it	  is	  deeply	  entwined	  with	  other	  practices	  and	  inter-­‐dependent	  
(Grote,	  2012).	  The	  challenge	  of	  studying	  governance	  in	  Russia,	  as	  it	  is	  elsewhere,	  is	  to	  grasp	  
the	  “mix”	  of	  technologies	  and	  practices	  and	  their	  trajectories	  over	  time	  (Davies	  and	  Spicer	  
2014).	  	  
Network	  governance	  theory	  and	  its	  critics	  
There	  has	  been	  extensive	  research	  into	  network	  governance	  since	  the	  1990s,	  concentrated	  
in	  but	  by	  no	  means	  limited	  to	  Europe	  (e.g.,	  Geddes	  2008).	  Though	  it	  became	  fashionable	  
only	  recently,	  the	  study	  of	  networks	  is	  far	  from	  new	  –	  emerging	  with	  Moreno’s	  “sociometry”	  
in	  the	  1930s,	  as	  a	  precursor	  to	  Social	  Network	  Analysis	  (e.g.	  Borgatti	  et	  al	  2009).	  In	  the	  mid-­‐
1970s,	  Granovetter	  (1983)	  developed	  the	  theory	  of	  strong-­‐weak	  ties,	  underpinning	  social	  
capital	  and	  neo-­‐institutionalist	  theories,	  highlighting	  the	  efficacy	  of	  networking	  for	  social	  
capital,	  resource	  mobilisation,	  and	  wellbeing.	  	  
	  
However,	  the	  explosion	  of	  network	  governance	  studies	  in	  the	  late	  20th	  and	  early	  21st	  
centuries	  was	  far	  more	  ideologically	  loaded	  and	  controversial,	  based	  on	  claims	  about	  
fundamental	  socio-­‐political	  transformation,	  from	  hierarchical	  and/or	  command-­‐based	  to	  
network-­‐based	  systems.	  Thinkers	  heralding	  the	  rise	  of	  networks	  pointed	  to	  several	  factors,	  
such	  as	  the	  decline	  of	  traditions	  including	  loyalty	  to	  the	  state,	  and	  the	  increased	  complexity	  
of	  policy	  making	  in	  a	  globalised	  context	  –	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  “risk	  society”	  (Beck,	  1992)	  -­‐	  and	  the	  
vastly	  increased	  access	  to	  knowledge,	  expertise,	  and	  connectivity	  enjoyed	  by	  lay-­‐citizens	  in	  





Today,	  the	  role	  of	  the	  government	  in	  the	  process	  of	  governance	  is	  much	  more	  contingent.	  
Local,	  regional,	  and	  national	  political	  elites	  alike	  seek	  to	  forge	  coalitions	  with	  private	  
businesses,	  voluntary	  associations	  and	  other	  societal	  actors	  to	  mobilize	  resources	  across	  
the	  public-­‐private	  border	  in	  order	  to	  enhance	  their	  chances	  of	  guiding	  society	  towards	  
politically	  defined	  goals.	  	  
In	  its	  guise	  as	  a	  theory	  of	  social	  change,	  network	  governance	  is	  based	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  
the	  authority	  and	  capacity	  of	  states	  are	  diminishing,	  requiring	  cooperation	  with	  corporate	  
and	  civil	  society	  actors	  in	  the	  formulation	  and	  delivery	  of	  public	  services.	  State-­‐centred	  
government	  is	  partly	  replaced	  by	  processes	  and	  practices	  where	  public,	  semi-­‐public,	  and	  
private	  resources	  and	  actors	  come	  together	  to	  pursue	  congruent	  (if	  not	  common)	  goals.	  The	  
literature	  suggests	  two	  sides	  to	  these	  functional	  explanations	  for	  the	  proliferation	  of	  
networks:	  problem-­‐centred	  and	  actor-­‐centred	  approaches.	  
For	  problem-­‐centred	  analysts,	  networks	  are	  functional	  responses	  to	  increasing	  societal	  
complexity	  and	  diversification,	  which	  weakens	  the	  capacity	  of	  states	  to	  govern	  efficiently	  
through	  traditional	  means	  of	  hierarchy	  and	  the	  market	  (Sørensen	  and	  Torfing	  2007:18,	  2011;	  
Mayntz	  1993).	  One	  such	  example	  is	  the	  doctrine	  of	  “wicked	  problems”	  (Roberts	  2000)	  –	  a	  
concept	  commonly	  applied	  in	  the	  context	  of	  network	  governance	  to	  denote	  challenges	  so	  
complex	  that	  they	  are	  difficult	  not	  only	  to	  solve	  but	  also	  to	  define.	  Networks	  rooted	  in	  
wicked	  problems	  may	  take	  many	  formal	  or	  informal	  forms,	  but	  the	  approach	  basically	  
stipulates	  that	  the	  public	  sector	  must	  collaborate	  with	  the	  market	  and	  civil	  society	  actors	  to	  
address	  21st	  century	  challenges	  (Huxham	  and	  Vangen	  2005;	  Osborne	  2010).	  	  
From	  the	  perspective	  of	  actors,	  network	  governance	  can	  alternatively	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  




(Rhodes	  1997).	  A	  central	  idea	  of	  the	  loose	  group	  of	  reform	  initiatives	  labelled	  under	  the	  
umbrella	  of	  “New	  Public	  Management”	  (NPM)	  is	  that	  autonomous	  agencies	  or	  public	  
companies	  cope	  better	  than	  classical	  multifunctional	  administrative	  units.	  From	  this	  point	  of	  
view,	  governance	  networks	  are	  inter-­‐organisational	  media	  for	  interest	  mediation	  between	  
interdependent,	  but	  conflicting	  actors	  each	  of	  which	  has	  a	  rule	  and	  resource	  base	  of	  their	  
own	  (Sørensen	  and	  Torfing	  2007:18).	  The	  rise	  of	  network	  governance	  is	  more	  or	  less	  
explicitly,	  understood	  as	  a	  critique	  of	  the	  modus	  operandi	  of	  the	  state	  in	  late	  modernity.	  	  
Problem	  and	  actor-­‐centred	  explanations	  form	  an	  important	  touch	  point	  for	  the	  research	  
discussed	  below.	  While	  we	  reject	  functional	  explanations	  –	  that	  networks	  arise	  because	  
societal	  logics	  dictate	  that	  they	  should	  –	  we	  are	  interested	  in	  whether	  these	  or	  other	  
rationales	  for	  collaboration	  appear	  in	  the	  dataset.	  	  	  
The	  influence	  of	  these	  perspectives	  in	  international	  public	  policy	  is	  hard	  to	  exaggerate.	  Policy	  
transfer	  is	  one	  important	  mechanism	  by	  which	  the	  idea	  of	  promoting	  governance	  networks	  
spreads	  around	  the	  world	  (Evans	  and	  Davies,	  1999).	  Transnational	  institutions	  like	  the	  
European	  Union,	  OECD,	  United	  Nations,	  and	  World	  Bank	  are	  vehicles	  for	  the	  diffusion	  of	  
network	  governance	  policies	  and	  programmes.	  The	  idea	  of	  network	  governance	  has	  spread	  
far	  beyond	  Europe.	  For	  example,	  the	  South	  African	  government	  enthusiastically	  promoted	  
the	  idea	  of	  a	  state-­‐civil	  society	  partnership,	  arguably	  inspired	  by	  New	  Labour	  in	  the	  UK	  
(Harrison,	  2006).	  Mexico	  is	  another	  country	  where	  state-­‐organised	  governance	  networks	  
have	  proliferated,	  influenced	  by	  global	  ideology,	  international	  governance	  institutions	  and	  
policy	  emulation	  (Flores	  2005:	  174).	  	  
Perhaps	  of	  greatest	  interest	  for	  current	  purposes	  is	  evidence	  that	  China	  has	  been	  




concerned	  about	  maintaining	  cohesion,	  it	  has	  adapted	  Western	  ideas	  about	  local	  community	  
building	  and	  partnership.	  Taylor	  (2004:	  pp.	  33-­‐34)	  cautioned	  that	  such	  processes	  are	  fragile	  
in	  a	  country	  where	  the	  Communist	  Party	  continues	  to	  dominate.	  	  However,	  our	  intuition	  was	  
that	  if	  network	  governance	  resonates	  in	  China,	  perhaps	  it	  does	  so	  in	  Russia	  as	  well.	  	  
Nevertheless,	  a	  degree	  of	  caution	  is	  necessary.	  The	  explosion	  of	  interest	  in	  networking,	  as	  a	  
novel	  or	  potentially	  transformative	  mode	  of	  governing,	  was	  quickly	  followed	  by	  a	  critical	  
backlash,	  tempering	  or	  rejecting	  the	  “epochalist”	  tone	  of	  these	  perspectives	  (e.g.,	  Marsh	  
2008;	  Davies	  2012).	  Some	  scholars,	  like	  Stone	  (2009)	  pointed	  out	  that,	  far	  from	  being	  
innovative,	  what	  we	  now	  call	  “network	  governance”	  has	  been	  evident	  in	  Western	  
democracies	  since	  at	  least	  the	  dawn	  of	  universal	  suffrage.	  States	  have	  always	  had	  to	  
cooperate	  with	  business	  and	  third-­‐sector	  activists	  (Røiseland	  2011).	  What	  has	  changed	  is	  the	  
vocabulary	  and	  normative	  salience	  of	  collaboration.	  Moreover,	  functional	  explanations	  of	  
the	  “need”	  for	  network	  governance	  pay	  little	  heed	  to	  actually-­‐existing	  social	  forces	  and	  
counter-­‐currents	  that	  might	  prevent	  it	  from	  arising	  in	  anything	  more	  than	  truncated	  or	  
tokenistic	  forms.	  	  
Critics	  in	  the	  Northern	  European	  heartlands	  of	  “network	  governance”	  point	  to	  multiple	  
network	  pathologies,	  both	  highlighting	  the	  limitations	  of	  functional	  explanation	  and	  pouring	  
cold	  water	  on	  extravagant	  claims	  for	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  “network	  society”.	  First,	  
governance	  networks	  are	  often	  state-­‐centred	  “invited	  spaces”,	  where	  government	  officials	  
select	  and	  invest	  in	  civil	  society	  organisations.	  When	  state	  investment	  dries	  up,	  networks	  
often	  fail,	  suggesting	  that	  they	  are	  sustained	  by	  “hierarchy”	  (e.g.	  Grote	  2012).	  The	  critical	  
literatures	  reveal,	  moreover,	  that	  networks	  are	  prone	  to	  closure	  and	  elite	  capture	  by	  




Another	  strand	  highlights	  that	  citizen	  activists	  and	  voluntary	  sector	  groups	  are	  often	  
recuperated	  or	  marginalised,	  particularly	  if	  they	  try	  to	  challenge	  neoliberal	  logics	  (Skelcher,	  
Mathur,	  and	  Smith	  2005).	  	  Moreover,	  critics	  argue	  that	  the	  levels	  of	  trust	  required	  to	  sustain	  
authentic	  network	  governance	  among	  diverse	  interest	  groups	  do	  not	  exist.	  For	  example,	  
Cook,	  Hardin,	  and	  Levy	  (2007:	  196)	  argued	  that	  “societies	  are	  essentially	  evolving	  away	  from	  
trust	  relationships	  towards	  externally	  regulated	  behaviour”	  –	  an	  intuition	  reflected	  in	  
widespread	  contempt	  for	  political	  elites	  dubbed	  provocatively	  as	  “anti-­‐politics”.	  	  
Network	  governance	  and	  the	  Russian	  context	  
The	  limitations	  of	  network	  governance	  in	  its	  European	  heartlands	  reinforce	  our	  confidence	  
that	  the	  theory	  of	  Russian	  exceptionalism	  is	  misconceived.	  Simply	  put,	  while	  Russian	  tropes	  
of	  authoritarianism	  and	  network	  failure	  are	  prominent	  in	  the	  West,	  Western	  vocabularies	  of	  
networks	  and	  collaboration	  populate	  elements	  of	  the	  Russian	  literature.	  	  Synthesising	  the	  
supportive	  and	  critical	  perspectives	  on	  network	  governance	  provides	  a	  powerful	  compass	  for	  
studying	  Russia.	  	  We	  adapt	  Ansell	  and	  Gash’s	  (2008:	  544)	  three-­‐part	  definition	  of	  
collaborative	  governance,	  using	  it	  as	  a	  proxy	  for	  network	  governance.	  Part	  1	  defines	  
collaborative	  governance	  as	  “[a]	  governing	  arrangement	  where	  one	  or	  more	  public	  agencies	  
directly	  engage	  non-­‐governmental	  actors	  in	  a	  collective	  decision-­‐making	  process”.	  We	  
broaden	  this	  to	  “collective	  discussion”.	  Part	  2	  defines	  collaborative	  governance	  as	  “formal,	  
consensus-­‐oriented,	  and	  deliberative”.	  This	  part	  is	  too	  narrow	  for	  our	  purposes,	  which	  
incorporate	  formal	  and	  informal	  processes	  and	  a	  much	  wider	  range	  of	  collaborative	  and	  
non-­‐deliberative	  practices.	  Focusing	  on	  authentic	  deliberation	  would	  exclude	  a	  range	  of	  far	  
more	  common	  collaborative	  practices	  associated	  with	  resource-­‐interdependency,	  




processes	  that	  “make	  or	  implement	  public	  policy	  or	  manage	  public	  programs	  or	  assets’.	  Our	  
study	  follows	  this	  element	  of	  the	  definition.	  	  
Finally,	  to	  ascertain	  the	  role	  of	  networking	  within	  our	  chosen	  areas,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  
contextualise	  it	  with	  other	  governance	  technologies	  including	  coercion,	  hierarchy,	  threat,	  
market	  competition,	  and	  contract.	  We	  suggest	  that	  these	  technologies	  are	  “universal”	  in	  the	  
sense	  of	  comprising	  the	  modalities	  of	  coordination	  and	  regulation	  operating	  in	  any	  political	  
system,	  and	  that	  an	  adequate	  analysis	  of	  the	  “mix”	  is	  vital	  for	  both	  diagnostic	  purposes	  and	  
theory	  building	  –	  in	  this	  case,	  eliciting	  the	  salience	  of	  Russian	  government-­‐civil	  society	  
networks,	  and	  the	  reasons	  for	  this.	  Insofar	  as	  coercion	  is	  concerned,	  the	  martial	  capacities	  of	  
the	  Russian	  state	  are	  evidently	  critical	  to	  its	  attempt	  to	  project	  power,	  both	  internally	  and	  
externally.	  Insofar	  as	  civil	  society	  is	  concerned,	  the	  politics	  of	  threat,	  discipline	  and	  
suppression	  remain	  widespread	  -­‐	  most	  evocatively	  the	  designation	  of	  certain	  NGOs	  as	  
“foreign	  agents”.	  	  Yet	  even	  here,	  Russia	  is	  not	  entirely	  exceptional	  in	  keeping	  an	  eye	  on	  
foreign-­‐funded	  NGOs.	  The	  USA	  requires	  that	  NGOs	  funded	  from	  abroad	  are	  open	  about	  it.	  	  
Since	  1976,	  Indian	  NGOs	  need	  special	  permission	  from	  the	  authorities	  to	  receive	  foreign	  
funds,	  and	  Israel's	  Justice	  Minister	  has	  proposed	  bill	  quite	  similar	  to	  the	  Russian	  law	  forcing	  
foreign-­‐funded	  NGOs	  to	  print	  labels	  on	  all	  of	  their	  official	  documents	  indicating	  by	  which	  
"foreign	  entity"	  they	  are	  financed.	  	  Therefore,	  the	  “agent	  law”	  is	  not	  necessarily	  a	  valid	  
measure	  of	  the	  Russian	  regime’s	  acceptance	  of	  civil	  society	  and	  NGOs	  but	  rather	  of	  its	  fear	  
of	  foreign	  influence	  that	  in	  worst	  case	  scenarios	  end	  up	  in	  “colour	  revolutions”.	  Russia	  differs	  





According	  to	  Davies	  (2014),	  state-­‐organised	  coercion	  takes	  multiple	  direct	  and	  indirect	  
forms.	  Violence	  refers	  to	  martial	  force	  applied	  in	  the	  governing	  arena	  –	  as	  the	  Russian	  
annexation	  of	  Crimea	  and	  continuing	  geopolitical	  struggles	  over	  Eastern	  Ukraine	  exemplify.	  
Strategies	  for	  sustaining	  order	  and	  controlling	  dissidence	  within	  Russia	  itself	  –	  the	  police,	  
Special	  Forces,	  and	  intelligence	  services	  also	  entail	  well-­‐documented	  instances	  of	  violence.	  
Gramsci	  (1971:	  159-­‐60)	  further	  described	  laissez	  faire	  as	  coercion	  in	  the	  form	  of	  economic	  
compulsion:	  a	  disciplinary	  strategy	  “introduced	  by	  legislative	  and	  coercive	  means”,	  placing	  
workers	  at	  the	  mercy	  of	  the	  labour	  market.	  Compelling	  people	  to	  take	  their	  chances	  in	  the	  
market	  is	  the	  ubiquitous	  form	  of	  coercion	  under	  capitalism,	  particularly	  European	  austerity	  
since	  2008,	  and	  despite	  government	  hostility	  to	  some	  oligarchs,	  the	  market	  operates	  in	  the	  
Russian	  economy	  much	  as	  it	  does	  in	  the	  West.	  	  
Administrative	  domination	  has	  two	  strands.	  It	  refers	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  to	  a	  hierarchical	  logic	  
of	  rule	  -­‐	  the	  capacities	  of	  a	  state	  or	  subdivision	  to	  secure	  obedience	  and	  loyalty	  from	  its	  
population;	  this	  is	  sovereignty	  as	  the	  “taken-­‐for-­‐granted	  order	  of	  things”	  (Ryan	  2006:	  191;	  6,	  
2014).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  administrative	  domination	  refers	  to	  routine	  enforcement	  
practices	  and	  the	  everyday	  coercive	  techniques	  underpinning	  sovereignty:	  law	  enforcement,	  
judicial	  arbitration,	  rent	  collection,	  and	  traffic	  management	  –	  techniques	  generally	  non-­‐
violent	  in	  themselves,	  but	  nevertheless	  coercive	  insofar	  as	  non-­‐compliance	  is	  criminalised.	  In	  
ascertaining	  the	  significance	  of	  network	  governance	  in	  Russia,	  we	  need	  to	  understand	  how	  
administrative	  domination,	  in	  both	  senses,	  operates	  within,	  alongside,	  and	  against	  networks.	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  direct	  coercion,	  the	  governance	  repertoire	  includes	  what	  Bang	  (2011)	  calls	  the	  
politics	  of	  threats	  (threatening	  and	  calling	  attention	  to	  perceived	  threats)	  and	  ‘selective	  law	  




hierarchy”	  (Jessop	  2004)	  –	  recognition	  of	  a	  regime’s	  capacity	  to	  impose	  sanctions	  without	  
necessarily	  doing	  so	  –	  or	  doing	  so	  selectively.	  The	  technologies	  of	  threat	  include	  everyday	  
surveillance	  (such	  as	  CCTV	  and	  internet	  monitoring)	  and	  the	  logics	  of	  performance	  
management	  and	  accountability	  embedded	  in	  neoliberal	  public	  services	  –	  rewards	  and	  
penalties.	  Again,	  the	  “foreign	  agents	  law”	  potentially	  serves	  both	  as	  a	  medium	  of	  direct	  
repression	  and	  as	  a	  source	  of	  self-­‐discipline	  among	  NGOs.	  	  
Market	  governance	  refers	  to	  the	  outsourcing	  of	  public	  functions	  to	  profit-­‐making	  
corporations	  and	  the	  exposure	  of	  public	  offices	  to	  competitive	  discipline.	  It	  incorporates	  the	  
practices	  of	  governance	  by	  contract	  –	  the	  implicit	  or	  explicit	  use	  of	  binding	  target-­‐based	  
agreements	  as	  the	  vehicle	  for	  coordinating	  and	  regulating	  governing	  outputs	  and	  outcomes.	  
Market-­‐centred	  governance	  (competition	  and	  judicially	  enforceable	  contracts)	  can	  be	  
distinguished	  from	  hierarchical	  (rule-­‐bound)	  governance	  and	  network	  governance	  (based	  on	  
trust	  or	  resource	  inter-­‐dependency).	  Sometimes	  they	  are	  mixed,	  as	  argued	  by	  Tarasenko	  
(2015)	  who	  describes	  authorities	  combining	  paternalism	  and	  neo-­‐liberalism	  in	  their	  relation	  
to	  civil	  organisations	  thereby	  fostering	  rent-­‐seeking	  as	  well	  as	  profit-­‐seeking	  behaviour	  
among	  the	  latter.	  In	  delineating	  the	  significance	  of	  network	  governance	  in	  our	  case	  studies,	  
we	  also	  need	  to	  be	  sensitive	  to	  the	  operations	  of	  formal	  and	  informal	  market	  mechanisms	  in	  
the	  policy	  areas.	  
In	  delineating	  the	  significance	  of	  network	  governance	  in	  our	  case	  studies,	  we	  also	  need	  to	  be	  
sensitive	  to	  the	  operations	  of	  formal	  and	  informal	  market	  mechanisms	  in	  the	  policy	  areas.	  
Our	  framework	  therefore	  treats	  hierarchies,	  markets	  and	  networks	  as	  integrative	  
mechanisms	  underpinning	  the	  institutions	  and	  practices	  of	  governance,	  alongside	  indirect	  




competition	  and	  contracts	  are	  unenforceable	  without	  courts	  and	  prisons”,	  and	  Grote	  (2012)	  
found	  that	  networks	  cannot	  subsist	  without	  a	  degree	  of	  hierarchical	  ordering.	  Equally,	  
however,	  the	  Russian	  state	  requires	  and	  benefits	  from	  networked	  relations	  with	  
domestically	  funded	  civil	  society	  groups,	  even	  if	  these	  are	  small-­‐scale,	  flanking	  mechanisms	  
or	  “invited	  spaces”.	  Our	  research	  challenge,	  based	  on	  our	  expansive	  definition	  of	  network	  
governance,	  is	  to	  explore	  how	  networks	  operate	  in	  Russia	  and	  comment	  on	  trajectories	  –	  
whether,	  despite	  the	  authoritarian	  flavour	  of	  Russian	  politics	  networking	  with	  civil	  society	  is	  
prevalent	  in	  parts	  of	  the	  policy	  making	  and	  implementation	  processes.	  	  
Research	  Findings	  –	  an	  Introductory	  Synthesis	  
In	  this	  section,	  we	  apply	  these	  tools	  to	  produce	  an	  introductory	  synthesis	  of	  the	  research	  
findings	  discussed	  in	  the	  symposium.	  We	  studied	  network	  governance	  in	  five	  policy	  areas	  
(migration	  and	  integration,	  drug	  policy,	  child	  protection,	  EIA,	  and	  ethnic	  policies).	  Here,	  we	  
elicit	  comparisons	  and	  contrasts	  across	  the	  articles	  and	  discuss	  their	  relevance	  for	  our	  
proposition	  that	  even	  in	  authoritarian	  regimes	  with	  relatively	  weak	  civil	  societies,	  different	  
forms	  of	  interactive	  governance	  take	  place,	  which	  can	  fruitfully	  be	  understood	  using	  the	  
tools	  of	  network	  governance	  theories,	  provided	  these	  are	  properly	  contextualized.	  
The	  idea	  of	  Network	  Governance	  is	  Prominent	  in	  Media	  Discourse	  
First,	  Handå	  Myhre	  and	  Berg-­‐Nordlie	  study	  representations	  of	  collaboration	  in	  Russian	  media	  
discourse.	  What	  emerges	  is	  a	  story	  of	  interdependency	  between	  state	  and	  societal	  actors.	  
They	  reveal	  a	  discourse	  in	  which	  a	  highly	  idealistic	  representation	  of	  the	  relationship	  
between	  state	  and	  civil	  society	  unfolds.	  As	  in	  Western	  discourses,	  this	  representation	  
revolves	  around	  mutual	  dependency	  and	  the	  necessity	  of	  cooperation	  to	  solve	  complex	  




in	  pursuit	  of	  common	  goals.	  Non-­‐state	  actors	  are	  depicted	  not	  as	  representing	  interest	  
groups,	  but	  rather	  as	  bringing	  a	  variety	  of	  resources	  to	  the	  table,	  where	  the	  goal	  is	  to	  reach	  
consensus	  about	  practical	  solutions	  to	  social	  problems.	  In	  the	  discourse,	  clinics	  for	  drug	  
addicts	  and	  counselling	  services	  for	  parents	  operated	  by	  non-­‐state	  actors	  are	  represented	  as	  
supplements	  to	  state-­‐run	  services,	  whereas	  teaching	  Russian	  traditions	  and	  the	  Russian	  
language	  to	  migrant	  populations,	  and	  providing	  assistance	  with	  formal	  registration	  in	  Russia,	  
is	  considered	  primarily	  an	  NGO	  task.	  Diaspora	  NGOs	  are	  expected	  to	  take	  significant	  levels	  of	  
responsibility	  for	  integrating	  immigrants.	  Also,	  the	  research	  emphasises	  the	  role	  played	  by	  
networks	  in	  monitoring	  policies	  and	  their	  implementation.	  This	  kind	  of	  monitoring	  is	  called	  
“public	  control”	  (“obshchestvennyi	  kontrol’’).	  	  
Media	  discourse	  therefore	  identifies	  two	  key	  policy	  tropes,	  familiar	  in	  Western	  European	  
governance	  literatures	  discussed	  earlier.	  The	  first	  is	  a	  striking	  discursive	  commitment	  to	  the	  
idea	  of	  network	  governance	  and	  the	  virtues	  of	  cooperation.	  The	  second	  is	  the	  assertion	  of	  
responsibility	  for	  non-­‐state	  actors	  to	  contribute	  governing	  resources,	  where	  the	  state	  cannot	  
or	  does	  not	  wish	  to	  do	  so.	  	  To	  an	  extent,	  therefore,	  media	  discourse	  is	  redolent	  of	  
international	  calls	  to	  collaborate	  and	  assume	  responsibility	  found	  in	  European	  third-­‐way	  
policy	  discourses	  on	  civil	  society.	  The	  detailed	  analyses	  of	  collaborative	  practice	  in	  other	  
contributions	  to	  the	  symposium	  show	  the	  variable	  ways	  in	  which	  these	  injunctions	  are	  
honoured	  and	  breached,	  spatially	  and	  across	  different	  policy	  areas.	  	  
Patterns	  of	  Hierarchy	  and	  Network	  Governance	  	  
Kropp	  and	  Schuhmann	  examine	  practices	  of	  collaboration	  between	  state	  and	  societal	  actors	  
within	  two	  policy	  areas,	  ethnic	  polices	  in	  multi-­‐ethnic	  regions	  and	  EIA.	  They	  find	  that	  the	  




institutional	  setting	  at	  all	  levels	  of	  governance;	  the	  presence	  of	  narrow	  and	  exclusive	  "state	  
networks";	  significant	  asymmetries	  between	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors;	  and	  the	  weak	  rule	  
of	  law.	  The	  EIAs	  under	  study	  are	  examples	  of	  “hybrid”	  governance	  combining	  “horizontal”	  
and	  “vertical”	  elements.	  A	  proper	  understanding	  of	  Russian	  governance	  requires	  a	  grasp	  of	  
variations	  within	  this	  hybrid	  form.	  Kropp	  and	  Schuhmann	  show	  how	  authorities	  in	  different	  
regions	  choose	  different	  approaches,	  one	  by	  enforcing	  “network	  closure”	  keeping	  critical	  
NGO’s	  out,	  the	  other	  standing	  back	  to	  allow	  a	  more	  self-­‐regulating	  network	  emerge.	  Their	  
studies	  of	  EIAs	  show	  how	  some	  authorities	  find	  it	  useful	  to	  facilitate	  horizontal	  network	  
governance	  processes.	  A	  formally	  correct	  procedure,	  where	  all	  opinions	  are	  heard,	  is	  
expected	  to	  give	  the	  final	  policy	  decision	  greater	  legitimacy	  throughout	  the	  population.	  The	  
authors	  show	  how,	  in	  one	  case,	  the	  state	  intervened	  to	  make	  sure	  participatory	  processes	  
were	  followed.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  when	  it	  was	  considered	  strategically	  important	  to	  deliver	  
a	  particular	  outcome,	  state	  agencies	  rescinded	  collaboration.	  In	  some	  cases,	  there	  is	  elite	  
capture	  of	  the	  networks,	  and	  there	  are	  elements	  of	  network	  governance	  in	  others.	  We	  find	  a	  
mix	  of	  governing	  technologies	  in	  variable	  and	  fluid	  combinations.	  
Aasland,	  Berg-­‐Nordlie,	  and	  Bogdanova	  develop	  further	  insights	  into	  the	  dynamics	  of	  network	  
openness	  and	  network	  closure.	  Their	  study	  of	  migration	  services	  identified	  a	  relatively	  closed	  
network	  built	  on	  state-­‐led	  selection	  biases.	  For	  example,	  well-­‐established	  diaspora	  
organisations	  are	  preferred	  collaborators,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  their	  main	  constituencies	  are	  
longer-­‐standing	  residents	  and	  not	  recent	  immigrants.	  The	  inclusion	  of	  respected	  diaspora	  
NGOs	  may	  help	  increase	  legitimacy	  but	  does	  not	  facilitate	  access	  to	  target	  groups	  –	  a	  case	  of	  




The	  authors	  find	  that	  the	  need	  for	  help	  with	  service	  delivery	  is	  one	  motive	  for	  authorities	  
inviting	  civil	  society	  into	  networks.	  Child	  welfare	  is	  one	  policy	  area	  in	  which	  this	  seems	  to	  be	  
the	  case.	  Encouraging	  NGOs	  to	  “produce	  value	  added”	  sparked	  off	  by	  grants	  is	  one	  way	  
whereby	  the	  authorities	  invite	  NGOs	  in.	  	  
Being	  actively	  involved	  in	  a	  governance	  network	  increases	  the	  opportunity	  for	  NGOs	  to	  win	  
contracts	  for	  service	  delivery.	  The	  studies	  of	  child	  welfare,	  drug	  use	  prevention,	  and	  
immigration	  found	  no	  examples	  of	  non-­‐state	  network	  participants	  being	  assigned	  decision-­‐
making	  authority.	  In	  fact,	  most	  networks	  were	  not	  obliged	  to	  process	  recommendations	  to	  
formal	  decision-­‐makers.	  In	  other	  words,	  they	  do	  not	  substitute	  the	  formal	  (elected)	  organs	  
when	  it	  comes	  to	  decision-­‐making,	  but	  may	  do	  it	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  information	  gathering	  and	  
legitimising	  policy	  processes.	  	  
In	  common	  with	  Kropp	  and	  Schuhmann,	  Aasland,	  Berg-­‐Nordlie,	  and	  Bogdanova	  discover	  
differences	  between	  policy	  areas	  and	  regions	  in	  how	  governance	  networks	  operate.	  
Immigration	  and	  drug	  control	  is	  more	  strictly	  governed	  by	  the	  federal	  level	  and	  gives	  less	  
leeway	  for	  the	  networks	  than	  child	  welfare.	  They	  suggest	  that	  the	  practices	  of	  network	  
governance	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  develop	  in	  donor	  regions	  –	  net	  contributors	  to	  the	  Federal	  
budget	  –	  than	  in	  subsidised	  regions.	  Kropp	  and	  Schuhmann	  similarly	  found	  that	  networks	  
function	  better	  in	  regions	  with	  a	  diverse	  economic	  structure	  than	  in	  regions	  dependent	  
primarily	  one	  resource	  (e.g.	  gas	  and	  oil).	  However,	  other	  factors	  play	  a	  role	  and	  make	  for	  
regional	  differences.	  Russia	  is	  a	  federation	  of	  85	  subjects.	  The	  federal	  subjects	  are	  not	  
equally	  authoritarian	  -­‐	  ethnically	  defined	  republics	  tend	  to	  be	  more	  so.	  Yet,	  Kropp	  and	  
Schuhmann	  find	  that	  authorities	  in	  two	  ethnically	  “unruly”	  regions	  in	  their	  study	  chose	  




observers,	  allowing	  more	  autonomous	  self-­‐regulating	  network	  to	  emerge.	  In	  the	  other	  
region,	  ethnic	  NGOs	  were	  not	  allowed	  to	  participate	  at	  all.	  In	  both	  cases,	  the	  state	  chose	  
whether	  to	  facilitate	  network	  governance	  as	  an	  invited	  space.	  	  
As	  our	  analytical	  framework	  anticipates,	  the	  articles	  show	  a	  variable	  and	  fluid	  mix	  of	  
governing	  technologies	  including	  the	  coercive,	  the	  hierarchical	  and	  the	  exclusionary	  as	  
expected,	  but	  also	  an	  element	  of	  collaboration	  and	  networking.	  This	  situation	  is	  far	  from	  the	  
Western	  ideal	  type,	  where	  networks	  escape	  state	  control,	  compelling	  government	  to	  engage	  
with	  other	  actors.	  But	  critical	  literatures	  show	  that	  the	  ideal	  type	  does	  not	  operate	  without	  
problems	  in	  Europe	  either.	  	  The	  contrast	  between	  positive	  rhetoric	  about	  networks	  and	  the	  
realpolitik	  of	  Russian	  governance	  echoes	  critical	  perspectives	  on	  the	  “inauthenticity”	  of	  
state-­‐sponsored	  networks	  discussed	  earlier.	  Kropp	  and	  Schuhmann	  and	  Aasland,	  Berg-­‐
Nordlie	  and	  Bogdanova	  depict	  network	  governance	  as	  a	  tool	  deployed	  selectively	  and	  
unevenly.	  Writing	  about	  New	  Labour	  in	  the	  UK,	  Stoker	  (2002)	  argued	  that	  its	  approach	  to	  
local	  governance	  could	  be	  defined	  as	  “contrived	  randomness”	  –	  constantly	  changing	  its	  
approach	  to	  keep	  local	  agencies	  on	  their	  toes.	  Future	  research	  might	  consider	  whether	  the	  
unevenness	  we	  find	  in	  the	  Russian	  context	  derives	  from	  the	  same	  kind	  of	  fatalistic	  strategy	  –	  
or	  whether	  it	  emerges	  reactively,	  unintentionally	  and	  on	  account	  of	  the	  enormous	  diversity	  
in	  Russian	  society.	  Either	  way,	  we	  are	  confident	  that	  the	  research	  demonstrates	  the	  value	  of	  
an	  analytical	  framework,	  which	  starts	  from	  the	  comparability	  of	  governance	  challenges	  in	  
different	  societies	  and	  which	  positions	  Russia	  on	  a	  continuum	  of	  practices	  and	  dilemmas	  
familiar	  throughout	  the	  Anglo-­‐European	  governing	  landscape.	  Networking	  operates	  in	  an	  
authoritarian	  (hierarchical	  and	  coercive)	  context.	  It	  depends	  on	  how	  far	  state	  actors	  and	  





The	  Russian	  variety	  of	  networking	  differs	  more	  in	  degree	  than	  in	  essence	  from	  the	  Anglo-­‐
European	  archetype.	  Russian	  governance	  networks	  differ	  in	  the	  ways	  members	  of	  networks	  
are	  recruited.	  They	  are	  invited	  in	  mainly	  as	  individuals	  rather	  than	  representatives	  of	  
organisations	  and	  behave	  accordingly	  within	  the	  networks.	  Russian	  network	  closure	  is	  
characterised	  by	  low	  acceptance	  of	  critical	  voices.	  Willingness	  to	  work	  constructively	  with	  
the	  state	  is	  the	  condition	  of	  being	  kept	  inside	  the	  network	  –	  a	  tendency	  also	  noted	  by	  critics	  
of	  network	  governance	  in	  the	  Anglo-­‐European	  literature.	  It	  was	  striking	  that	  Russian	  media	  
discourse	  uses	  familiar	  Anglophone	  tropes	  of	  complexity	  and	  mutual	  dependency	  to	  justify	  
government-­‐civil	  society	  networks.	  However,	  the	  right	  of	  the	  state	  to	  decide	  when	  and	  how	  
to	  involve	  other	  actors	  is	  never	  questioned.	  
Table	  1	  is	  a	  simple	  heuristic	  outlining	  the	  basic	  parameters	  of	  state-­‐centred,	  market	  and	  
network	  modes	  of	  governing,	  benchmarked	  against	  our	  exploratory	  findings	  in	  Russia.	  	  
Valued	  Goods	   State	   Market	   Network	   Russia	  
Efficiency	   Hierarchical	  order,	  
state	  authority,	  
sovereignty.	  	  




Networks	  contribute	  to	  solving	  
complex	  problems	  in	  context	  of	  
state	  authority.	  	  Some	  
territorial	  and	  policy	  variations	  











interdependencies.	  	  No	  
deliberation	  	  
Control	   Loyalty,	  status-­‐
recognition,	  
command,	  force.	  
Contract	   Trust,	  affect,	  
consensus.	  
State-­‐centred	  –	  command	  and	  
force	  prominent.	  Networking	  
when	  sanctioned	  by	  authorities	  
Responsibility	   Follow	  the	  rules	  









NGOs	  follow	  rules	  in	  network	  
arena	  and	  contribute	  by	  
sharing	  expertise/	  
information/labour	  and	  
conferring	  governing	  legitimacy	  




Finally,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  interesting	  insights	  in	  all	  three	  articles	  is	  that	  the	  distinction	  
between	  state	  and	  civil	  society	  is	  itself	  often	  hard	  to	  pin	  down.	  Actors	  in	  the	  same	  governing	  
arena	  can	  belong	  to	  either	  category	  or	  both	  depending	  on	  their	  role	  in	  a	  particular	  policy	  
process.	  Members	  of	  networks	  often	  see	  each	  other	  as	  experts	  rather	  than	  formal	  
representatives	  of	  their	  organisations.	  We	  suggest	  that	  this	  role	  blurring	  points	  to	  a	  
significant	  analytical	  challenge,	  and	  problematises	  any	  simplistic	  distinction	  between	  “state”	  
and	  “civil	  society”.	  When	  Gramsci	  described	  Eastern	  civil	  society	  as	  “gelatinous’,	  he	  had	  in	  
mind	  that	  the	  distinction	  with	  the	  governmental	  apparatus	  was	  not	  well	  developed,	  in	  
contrast	  with	  the	  West.	  Yet,	  critical	  literatures	  on	  civil	  society	  in	  the	  West	  also	  point	  to	  the	  
fact	  that	  government,	  corporations,	  and	  NGOs	  are	  perhaps	  increasingly	  inter-­‐dependent	  and	  
inter-­‐woven.	  As	  Buttigieg	  (2005)	  argued,	  the	  fashionable	  Anglophone	  generalisation	  about	  
civil	  society	  development	  as	  “progressive”	  or	  “democratising”	  does	  not	  stand	  up	  to	  scrutiny.	  
The	  relationship	  between	  the	  pillars	  of	  civil	  society	  and	  the	  state	  is,	  he	  suggests,	  more	  often	  
symbiotic	  than	  conflictual.	  It	  may	  therefore	  be	  fruitful	  to	  consider	  whether	  the	  hybrid	  
governance	  that	  the	  Russian	  example	  demonstrates	  is	  replicated	  more	  widely	  in	  Europe.	  The	  
experience	  of	  austerity	  and	  privatisation	  of	  key	  state	  functions,	  including	  sharp	  reductions	  in	  
state	  support	  for	  NGOs	  and	  a	  service-­‐commissioning	  environment,	  increasingly	  ties	  civil	  
society	  to	  public	  sector	  goals	  under	  increasingly	  stringent	  performance	  management.	  This	  
suggests	  that	  comparisons	  between	  Russian	  “hybrid	  authoritarian”	  and	  Western	  “privatised	  
neo-­‐liberal”	  governance	  could	  be	  instructive.	  	  
Conclusion	  
Our	  opening	  premise	  was	  scepticism	  towards	  narratives	  of	  Russian	  exceptionalism.	  




analysing	  governance	  familiar	  in	  Europe	  could	  fruitfully	  be	  used	  to	  study	  at	  least	  a	  limited	  
range	  of	  government-­‐civil	  society	  relations	  in	  Russia.	  Our	  principal	  insight	  and	  contribution	  
to	  the	  literature	  on	  Eastern	  Europe	  is	  to	  have	  shown	  that	  a	  common	  frame	  of	  analysis	  opens	  
up	  the	  prospects	  for	  fruitful	  dialogue	  and	  comparison.	  The	  Russian	  context	  is	  different,	  the	  
dilemmas	  and	  technologies	  applied	  in	  trying	  to	  address	  them	  often	  familiar.	  We	  make	  three	  
points	  in	  conclusion.	  	  
First,	  networking	  with	  civil	  society	  groups	  matters	  in	  Russian	  social	  policy	  and	  is	  comparable	  
with	  networking	  in	  Western	  Europe.	  It	  is	  sanctioned	  by	  the	  state	  and	  prominent	  in	  media	  
discourse,	  but	  applied	  instrumentally	  and	  selectively.	  	  As	  the	  symposium	  shows,	  it	  may	  ebb	  
and	  flow	  in	  different	  areas	  and	  different	  regions.	  The	  dilemma	  is	  that	  if	  the	  state	  erodes	  civil	  
society	  autonomy,	  rolls	  back	  networking	  and	  excludes	  critical	  voices,	  then	  it	  will	  lack	  reliable	  
information	  required	  to	  develop	  successful	  policies.	  Second,	  as	  Rhodes	  (1997)	  put	  it,	  it	  is	  the	  
mix	  that	  matters.	  While	  governance	  enthusiasts	  in	  Europe	  have	  been	  guilty	  of	  exaggerating	  
the	  importance	  of	  networks,	  studies	  of	  Russian	  authoritarianism	  may	  do	  the	  opposite	  in	  
failing	  to	  recognise	  the	  limits	  of	  state	  and	  corporate	  power	  and	  the	  dependence	  of	  the	  
regime	  on	  others	  to	  deliver	  goods	  that	  it,	  and	  citizens,	  value.	  Third,	  however,	  the	  tentative	  
influence	  of	  civil	  society	  in	  Russian	  social	  policy	  is	  not	  necessarily	  a	  force	  for	  
democratisation.	  Critical	  voices	  are	  silenced	  and	  excluded.	  Moreover,	  the	  blurring	  of	  roles	  
highlights	  an	  enduring	  problem	  for	  studies	  of	  government	  and	  civil	  society	  in	  Russia	  and	  far	  
beyond.	  When	  is	  the	  distinction	  meaningful?	  What	  impact	  does	  the	  remaking	  of	  relations	  
between	  government,	  market,	  and	  citizen	  in	  conditions	  such	  as	  European	  austerity	  have	  on	  
the	  capacity	  of	  NGOs	  to	  speak	  truth	  to	  power?	  Our	  research	  opens	  up	  this	  and	  other	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